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IL STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from the district court's judgment dismissing Mr. Thomas Zachary Alec
Paulk's petition for post-conviction relief, \vhich it issued after granting the state's motion to
dismiss the petition as untimely. CR 115-116, 118.
B.

General Course of Proceedings
1.

Underlying criminal proceedings

On March 11, 2011, the state charged Mr. Paulk with lewd conduct and forcible
penetration with a foreign object, alleging that he penetrated a two-year-old's genital opening
during a diaper change with sexual intent. CR 39-40. A jury found Mr. Paulk guilty of both
charges. CR 41. On December 20, 2011, the district court sentenced Mr. Paulk to concurrent,
unified terms of fifteen years with minimum periods of confinement of five years. CR 94.
On March 12, 2012, the state moved to dismiss the lewd conduct charge because I.R.P.C
3.8(h) requires a prosecutor to "seek to remedy" a conviction when aware of clear and
convincing evidence that a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime he did not commit.
CR 45-46. Specifically, Mr. Paulk's participated in psychological and polygraph evaluations
prior to sentencing. CR 70-94. Mr. Paulk's statements during the course of these evaluations determined non deceptive by a polygrapher

established that Mr. Paulk did not act with sexual

intent. Id The district court dismissed the lewd conduct court and re-imposed the same sentence
on the penetration charge. CR 47, 49, 58-59.
Sexual penetration also requires a defendant to act with sexual intent. I.C. § 18-6608

punishable by life in prison to penetrate the genital opening of another person "for the
purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse" against the person's will). Thus. the same clear
and convincing evidence that established Mr. Paulk did not commit lewd conduct established
that he \Vas vvrongfully convicted of sexual pcnctiation. Nevertheless, neither the State nor l\r1r.

Paulk's attorney moved to dismiss or otherwise challenge the penetration conviction.
Mr. Paulk appealed and the Court of Appeals issued an unpublished opinion affirming the
judgment and sentence on September 10, 2013, which the district court filed that same day. CR
57, 61. The Supreme Court issued a remittitur on October 9, 2013, which the district court filed
over five weeks later on November 14, 2013. CR 61.

2.

Post-conviction proceedings

On October 28, 2014, Mr. Paulk signed and mailed a petition for post-conviction relief
and various supporting materials. CR 3-38. The district court filed Mr. Paulk's petition and other
documents on November 3, 2014. CR 3-10. In outlining the criminal action's procedural history,
the petition indicated that "the Remittitur was Issued 11/14/13" and attached the criminal case's
register of actions, which includes an entry for November 14, 2013, which states "(SC)
Remittitur." CR 18, 61.
The district court appointed an attorney to represent Mr. Paulk. CR I 08. The state moved
to dismiss, arguing that the district court received the post-conviction petition on November 3,
2014, whereas this Court issued the remittitur from Mr. Paulk' s direct appeal on October 9,
2013. CR 110-11. At a status conference, the district court allowed additional time to brief the
statute oflimitations Tr. p. 11, In. 5-12. The district court further indicated that it would allow
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additional time to respond to the substantive issues raised in the petition if it determined that Mr.
Paulk timely filed his post-conviction petition. Id. at p. 11, In. 12 - p. 12, In. 18.
Mr. Paulk argued that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled because he
reasonably relied on the date the district court filed the remittitur to calculate the deadline.
Petitioner's Brief Re: Statute of Limitation, 1 p. 3-4. Mr. Paulk further argued that dismissing his
petition as untimely, particularly where the district court supplied the misleading information and
the petition was filed less than 30 days after expiration of the statute oflimitations, would
deprive him of a meaningful opportunity to present his post-conviction claims as guaranteed by
due process. Id. The district court dismissed the petition, finding that Mr. Paulk's reliance on the
district court's filing of the remittitur did not fall within either of the two recognized bases to toll
the statute of limitations. Tr. p. 15, In. 1-23; CR 116-118. This appeal follows.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the district court violate Mr. Paulk's right to due process by summarily

dismissing Mr. Paulk's petition for post-conviction relief because he established an issue of fact
as to whether the district court's register of actions misled Mr. Paulk and thwarted his diligent
efforts to timely initiate post-conviction proceedings thereby presenting circumstances
sufficiently rare, exceptional and beyond Mr. Paulk's control to justify equitable tolling of the
statute of limitations?
2.

Must this case be remanded because the district court ruled it would allow further

opportunity to address the substantive issues if Mr. Paulk overcame timeliness problem?
I Mr. Paulk is asking the Court to augment that brief into the appellate record in a separate
motion to augment.
3

IV. ARGUMENT

A.

Standard of Review
A district court may only summarily dismiss a post-conviction action when the

petitioner's evidence does not raise a genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in his favor,
would entitle him to the requested relief. Amboh v. State, 149 Idaho 650,651,239 P.3d 448,449
(Ct. App. 2010);Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho 381,384,924 P.2d 1225, 1228 (Ct. App. 1996). If
such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Id. This Court
independently reviews the district court's application oflaw to undisputed facts in an appeal from
a summary dismissal. Amboh, 149 Idaho at 651,239 P.3d at 449; Loman v. State, 138 Idaho 1, 2,
56 P.3d 158, 159 (Ct. App. 2002). A petitioner who raises factual and intertwining legal issues
that could establish a basis to equitably toll the statute of limitation is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing. See Abbott, 129 Idaho at 385, 924 P.2d at 1229.
B.

The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Paulk's Petition for PostConviction Relief Because He Established an Issue of Fact as to Whether the District
Court's Register of Actions Misled Mr. Paulk and Thwarted his Diligent Efforts to
Timely Initiate Post-Conviction Proceedings Thereby Presenting Circumstances
Sufficiently Rare, Exceptional and Beyond Mr. Paulk's Control to Justify Equitable
Tolling of the Statute of Limitations
Mr. Paulk presented issues of material fact as to whether he diligently pursued his post-

conviction rights and reasonably relied on date reflected on the district court's register of actions
to calculate the statute of limitations' expiration. The district court's provision of misleading
information that thwarted Mr. Paulk's diligent efforts establishes a rare and exceptional
circumstance justifying equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.
Idaho Code§ 19-4902(a) requires petitioners to initiate a post-conviction action within
one year from the date the time to appeai expired in the criminal case, one year from the appeal's
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determination or one year from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever

See also Mahler v. State,157 Idaho 212, 214-15, 335 P.3d 57. 59-60 (Ct. App. 2014). In

1s

situations where the defendant initiates a valid appeal, this Court construes Section l 9-4902(a) to
require a defendant to file a post-conviction petition within one year from when the direct appeal
becomes final as evidenced by the date it issues the remittitur. Amboh, 149 Idaho at 652, 239 P.3d
at 450.
Equitable tolling is borne of the petitioner's due process right to have a meaningful
opportunity to present his or her claims. Gutierrez-Medina v. State, 157 Idaho 34, 36, 333 P.3d
849,851 (Ct. App. 2014); Leer v. State, 148 Idaho 112,114,218 P.3d 1173, 1175 (Ct. App.
2009); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (fundamental requisite of due
process of law is opportunity to be heard and hearing must be at meaningful time and in
meaningful manner). A petitioner can meet the high bar for equitable tolling bar in postconviction actions by demonstrating rare and exceptional circumstances beyond the petitioner's
control that prevented the petition's timely filing. Mahler, 157 Idaho at 215,335 P.3d at 60; Leer,
148 Idaho at 115,218 P.3d at 1176. Idaho appellate courts do not permit equitable tolling where
the post-conviction petitioner's own lack of diligence caused or contributed to the petition's
untimeliness. Amboh, 149 Idaho at 653,239 P.3d at 451; see also Kriebel v. State, 148 Idaho 188,
190, 219 P.3d 1204, 1206 (Ct.App.2009) (even assuming petitioner lacked access to Idaho legal
materials while incarcerated out-of-state for less than four months, he had over nine months to file
a timely petition but failed to do so); Leer, 148 Idaho at 115, 218 P .3d at 1176 (petitioner
demonstrated the ability to craft and file a petition, but failed to timely file one).
The district court declined to equitably toll the time to file Mr. Paulk's petition because his
situation did not fall into either of the two circumstances in which Idaho appellate courts have
5

recognized equitable tolling in a post-conviction action: ( l) where the petitioner was incarcerated
out-of-state with neither legal representation nor access to Idaho legal materials and (2) where
mental disease, psychotropic medication or other circumstances outside the petitioner's control
prevented the timely filing of the post-conviction petition. See Tr. p. 15, In. 6-12; Mahler, 157
Idaho at 215,335 P.3d at 60; Leer v. State, 148 Idaho 112,115,218 P.3d 1173, 1176 (Ct. App.
2009).
However, mental incapacity and out-of-state incarceration are not the only two rare and
exceptional circumstances that could deprive a post-conviction petitioner of a meaningful
oppo1iunity to have his post-conviction claims heard. To the contrary, appellate decisions
addressing situations where the petitioner's lack of diligence caused or contributed to the
petition's untimeliness have implicitly recognized that circumstances in addition to incapacity and
out-of-state incarceration could prevent timely initiating a post-conviction action. See Schultz v.

State, 151 Idaho 383,387,256 P.3d 791, 795 (Ct. App. 2011) (fact that petitioner chose not to file
his post-conviction petition earlier due to mistaken belief that the law allowed additional time did
not deprive him of the reasonable opportunity to do so) contrasting with Judd v. State, 148 Idaho
22, 26, 218 P.3d 1, 5 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding that discovery exception to a statute of limitation
applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law).
Mr. Paulk's circumstances involve neither physical nor mental inability to timely file.
Regardless of whether he was otherwise capable of timely filing, the district court's register of
actions misled Mr. Paulk into believing the statute of limitations expired November 14, 2014. He
submitted his post-conviction materials for mailing well in advance of that deadline - on October
28, 2014 - and those were filed by the district court on November 3, still eleven days before Mr.
Paulk was led to believe his time expired.
6

The instant circumstances can be contrasted with those in Amboh, where the petitioner
nearly a year and a half to inquire about his appeal's disposition and, had he exercised
reasonable diligence, he could have determined that the appeal was dismissed long before the
post-conviction limitation period expired. Amboh, 149 Idaho at 653, 239 P.3d at 451. The Court
of Appeals reasoned that neither the state "nor anyone else concealed from Amboh" that his
appeal had been dismissed as untimely Id. The Court thus held that equitable tolling would be
inappropriate because Amboh's own lack of diligence instead of "extraordinary circumstance
beyond his control" caused his petition to be untimely. Id.
Here, the district court's register of actions, unlike the Supreme Court's, is publically
available online and is widely utilized by the public and the bar to obtain information concerning
judicial proceedings. The unpublished opinion on direct appeal was both issued and filed in the
district court on September 2013. Other than the names of the clerk and judge, the district court's
register only reflects the date

November 14, 2014

and indicates "SC Remittitur." CR 61.

Without further details, such as reference to the date that the Supreme Court issued the remittitur
in the entry, a person reviewing the repository would have no reason to question the entry's
accuracy, particularly where the district court filed the Court of Appeals' unpublished opinion the
date it was issued. Attorneys 2 and laypersons alike could be misled into believing the district
court register of actions reflected the date the Supreme Court issued the remittitur.
Because Mr. Paulk had no reason to suspect the district court's register of actions was
2 Over her years of practice, the undersigned attorney has learned there is generally a gap
between this Court issuing a remitittur and the district court filing that remitittur. Counsel has
fielded many questions from the bar, public and inmates who had mistakenly believed that the
district court repository reflected the date the remittitur was issued. Such confusion could be
avoided entirely if the district court's entry reflected the date the remittitur was issued, for
instance, in this circumstance indicating something to the effect of: "SC Remittitur issued 10-913."
7

he had no reason to confirm the date with the Supreme Court. Further. the record
suggests that Mr. Paulk diligently attempted to protect his right to initiate post-conviction
proceedings. His petition and supporting pleadings encompass thirty-five pages and the petition
attaches another approximate seventy pages of exhibits. Given the resources available to inmates,
these pro se documents must represent several months of diligent preparation.
Mr. Paulk used copies of the appellate record created in his direct appeal to support his
petition, which of course does not include the remittitur. See CR 39-40 (Dkt CR 10-11 ), 41 (93)
42 (92), 43-44 (94-95), 45 (121), 46 (120) 47-48 (126-27), 49-50 (124-25); 62 (30), 29(63), 64
(31), 65 (32), 105-06 (60-61). Mr. Paulk reasonably turned to the district court repository to
determine the date remittitur was filed - a document that contains no useful information beyond
establishing the date on which appellate proceeding became final. While the repository was
printed on October 9, 2014, the date simply reflects when the district court printed the register
that was used as an exhibit, likely at the request of someone like Mr. Paulk' s mother, who assisted
him in filing the petition and provided a supporting affidavit. See CR 28, 51-61, 95-97. Since
Mr. Paulk's petition reflects months of diligent preparation, the most probable inference is that he
attempted to ascertain the deadline long before it expired by utilizing the mechanism inmates
generally rely on to obtain information about their cases

asking friends, family or attorneys to

look at the online repository.
The record before the district court establishes issues of fact as to whether Mr. Paulk
diligently pursued his post-conviction rights and reasonably relied on information published by
the district court to calculate the statute of limitations' expiration. These circumstances -

where

information published by the court thwarted a prose inmate's diligent efforts to timely initiate
post-conviction relief -are sufficiently rare, exceptional and beyond Mr. Paulk's control to
8

J

equitable tolling of the statute oflimitations. The district com1 thus erred in summarily

dismissing the petition as untimely.

C.

This Case Must Be Remanded Because the District Court Ruled It Would Allow
Further Opportunity to Address the Substantive Issues if it Found the Petition
Timely Filed

At a status conference, post-conviction counsel indicated that he had not been able to
communicate with Mr. Paulk and requested additional time to consult with him regarding both the
substantive issues in the petition and its timeliness. Tr. p. 5, In. 10

p. 6, In. 4; p. 9, In. 1-p.

10, In. 9. The district court allowed an additional two weeks to address the statute of limitations
issue. Id. at p. 11, In. 5-12. The district then indicated that if it ruled in Mr. Paulk's favor with
respect to the statute of limitations, it would set a status conference to allow additional time to
address the substantive issues in the petition. Id. at p. 11, In. 12

p. 12, In. 17.

Mr. Paulk did not have an opportunity to work with his attorney to support his claims and
the district court ruled he should have the opportunity to do so if he could overcome the statute of
limitations' expiration. Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to affirm on any alternate ground
concerning whether Mr. Paulk's petition raised genuine issues of material fact entitling him relief.
Instead, this Court should reverse the district court's dismissal on timeliness grounds and remand
the case to the district court to allow Mr. Paulk the opportunity to work with his attorney and
support his post-conviction claims.
V. CONCLUSION

Mr. Paulk respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court's judgment dismissing
his post-conviction claims and to remand this case for further proceedings.
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Respectfully submitted thi~~~ day of December, 2014.
IN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

obyn Fyffe
Attorney for Thomas Zachary Paulk

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

L 2.day of December, 2015, I caused two true and

correct copies of the foregoing to be mailed to:
Office of the Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
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